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NOTE: BUSH V. SHALALA AND PRATTS V. CHATER:
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY PING PONG AND
CONTRASTING APPROACHES IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT:
THE CENTRAL ROLE OF AN ACTIVE ALJ
Jorge J. Vera, Jr.*
I. Introduction
These two cases which reach contrary conclusions on
entitlement to disability conclusions demonstrate the importance of the
active role of an ALJ. in a social security case. In one case, ten years
of delay resulted from inadequate investigation. In the second case
inadequate understanding of the contents of the administrative record
delay granting a claim for years and resulted in remand.
On the surface, there is apparent inconsistency between two
decisions of different panels of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. In the first case, the United States CoJurt of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in the 1996 case of Bush v. Shalala' reversed the
district court's decision and remanded the case back to the district court
for reinstatement of the Secretary's determination and dismissal of the
claim for social security disability insurance. The denial rejected
District Judge C. J. Sifton's holding that the court had not been
provided with findings of facts and conclusions of law of some
complexity and that a ten-year delay alone was sufficient basis to
remand benefits. The appellate court held that substantial evidence2
existed to support a finding against the claimant, although a ten-year
delay had occurred. In the second case, Pratts v. Chater3 a different
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
vacated the district court's denial of a claim for social security
*he author is a third year student at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
"Substantial evidence," in the social security disability insurance context, means
"more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 28
L. Ed. 2d 842, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (1971) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Pratts
v. Chater 94 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1996)
2 94 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 1996)
3 94 F.3d 34
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disability insurance and remanded the matter to the Commissioner for
further development of substantial evidence. The denial rejected
District Court's finding that substantial evidence supported the denial
of benefits. The appellate court held that the denial of benefits was not
supported by substantial evidence and was based upon legal error.
II. Background
A. Bush v. Shalala
Eleven years ago, Florence Bush, filed an application for
disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act.
Her application stated that, due to a chronic cough, she was unable to
work.4 Ms. Bush had worked as a file clerk/typist and as a bank teller.
This is an ordinary social security disability claim which has
been in the administrative and judicial systems for over ten years with
five hearings before Administrative Law Judges5 , five denials by the
Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration,6 and three
hearings before District Judge Sifton.
The first ALJ hearing took place in March of 1986 before ALJ
Sidney Fenster. Ms. Bush, appeared pro se, testified that she was
unable to work due to her cough. AL5 Fenster denied the plaintiffs
claim, finding that Ms. Bush was able to return to her past relevant
work and was not "disabled" as defined by the Social Security Act. Ms.
Bush then sought her first review by the Appeals Council. In July
1986, the Appeals Council denied her appeal. Ms. Bush then sought
judicial review in the Eastern District of New York. The district court
remanded the case to the SSA for further investigation of the plaintiffs
medical situation.7
4 However, AU Nisnewitz went on to find that the Ms. Bush's "impairment did
not prevent [her] from performing her past relevant work as a bank teller from her alleged
onset of disability on May 24, 1985 through her date last insured on December 31,
1989."p.8
5Hereinafter, AL
'Hereinafter, the Appeals Council
I Judge Sifton held that AL Fenster ignored a residual functional capacity
assessment showed that the Ms. Bush suffered from allergies and needed to avoid certain
work environments. The residual functional capacity evaluation contained in the record
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Upon remand, in September of 1987, Dr. James Vevaina,
examined Ms. Bush.9 The second hearing before ALJ Fenster was held
in January of 1988. Ms. Bush argued through counsel that Dr.
Vevaina's examination was deficient. However, ALJ Fenster again
found that Ms. Bush was not disabled and denied benefits. Tthe
Appeals Council refused once again to hear her claim. Upon returning
to the district court, Judge Sifton remanded the case for yet further
inquiry. '
Ms. Bush's entitlement to social security disability insurance
ended on December 31, 1989.11 Pursuant to the district court's remand,
plaintiff saw Dr. Vevaina again in May of 1990. Dr. Vevaina reported
that the plaintiff had symptoms of cough and sinusitis, that there was
no evidence of asthma or emphysema, and that she was not disabled.
Judge Sifton remanded to a third hearing was held in August of
1990. Ms. Bush submitted, as evidence, the letters from Drs. Weinstock
and Schmitt 2 as well as Medicare billing statements and bills. Based
"recognized that this woman suffered from allergies, asthma, should avoid work
environments including dust, humidity, temperature extrenres, e cetera."
I The Secretary at oral argument escribed Dr. Vevaina as a Social Security
doctor,
I Dr. Vevaina noted that Ms. Bush's symptoms were coughing, sputum
production, wheezing, and shortness of breath. Dr. Vevaina's diagnosis stated that Ms.
Bush suffered from chronic bronchitis and a post-nasal drip. He found no limitation with
respect to Ms. Bush's ability to liP and carry, stand, or walk. The only work limitations he
noted were that she was to avoid temperature extremes, chemicals, dust, and fumes.
"' "In August 1989, the district court...remanded the case. The court found that
ALJ Fenster had erred by relying on Dr. Vevaina's report without more testing. It also
found that the ALJ had misapplied the burdens of proof in requiring the plaintiff, on her
own, to pursue additional testing to support her claims." "[Tihe court ordered further
inquiry regarding any environmental restrictions on the plaintiffs ability to perform her
past relevant work."
11 Because her entitlement to disability insurance benefits expired on December
31, 1989, Ms. Bush had to show that she was disabled before that date in order to be
eligible for disanilit, benefits.
12 Dr. WeinscocK, in a July 1990 letter to Ms. Bush's attorney, wrote that he
continued to treat the plaintiff for allergic rhinitis and asthma. Dr. Gary Weinstock reported
that Ms. Bush still required medication for her allergies and that she had severe symptom
exacerbations with exposure to dust, damp weather, or flowers. She also had developed
food allergies that increased her rhinitis. He stated that Ms. Bush should avoid work
environments with cigarette smoke, dust, mold spores, or flowers. Dr. Laura Scl'mitt, Ms,
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on the testimony, 13 ALJ Fenster issued his third consistent decision
finding that the plaintiff was not disabled 4 Ms. Bush asked for review
for the third time. The Appeals Council in May of 1991 remanded the
case for further administrative inquiry into plaintiffs symptoms. 5
The fourth hearing was held before ALJ Richard Karpe' 6 After
the hearing, ALJ Karpe denied Ms. Bush's application, concluding that
she was not disabled because she was capable of returning to her past
relevant work. Ms. Bush asked the Appeals Council to review th,;
decision for the fourth time. In December of 1992, the Council
remanded for an additional evaluation of plaintiffs subjective
complaints of pain.' 7
A fifth administrative hearing was held in May 1993 before AU
David Nisnewitz. Judge Nisnewitz, after reviewing the medical
evidence'", again denied Ms. Bush's application for benefits.
Bush's dentist, also submitted a note to Ms. Bush's attorney in July of 1990. Dr. Schmitt
reported that her dental work on Ms. Bush often had to be interrupted to permit the her to
cough, that she gasped for breath at times, and that she had to sit with her head raised
during dental procedures due to a large quantity of mucus.3Dr, Morton Rosen a vocational expert apparently called by the government,
testified that a person with a moderate asthmatic condition who requires an allergen-free
environment is nonetheless able to function in an air-conditioned environment such as a
bank.
'1 He stated that Ms. Bush's allergies did not prevent her from functioning in her
past relevant work.
'
51t requested that an ALJ "make specific findings as to the credibility of the
claimant's complaints and their effect on her ability to function."
6At that hearing, Dr. Richard Wagner was called by the government as a medical
advisor. He testified that Ms. Bush's bronchoscopy and chest x-ray results were normal and
that she suffered only from allergies. He testified that Ms. Bush should avoid temperature
extremes, dust, and fumes, and thot shc should not lift hcavy objects.
" It ordered the AU to: address the issue of ,he claimant's subjective complaints
during the period at issue within the guidelines set foith in 20 CFR 404.1529. The rationale
includes such factors as the laimant's daily activitie,3, the kinds, amounts, and frequency of
any medications taken d-ring the period at issue, pertinent medical findings ard opinions,
and observations of the claimant.
11 Judge Nisnewitz found that while she suffers from a severe respiratory
impairment, that impairment failed to meet or equal the level of severity of any disabling
condition contained in Appendix 1, Subpart P of Social Security Regulations No. 4. Her
ability to sit, stand, walk and lift was unlimited. His conclusion corresponded with that of
Ms. Bush's treating physician, Dr. Weinstock, who recommended, in July 1990, that Ms.
Bush avoid exposure to cigarette smoke and increased amounts of dust, mold an flowers.
On physical examinations, the claimant has displayed normal breath sounds, with
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The Appeals Council turned down the Ms.Bush's request for review in
June of 1994.
In August of 1994, Ms. Bush petitioned the district court for the
third time challenging the denial of benefits. In May of 1996, Judge
Sifton granted Ms. Bush's motion and entered judgment in her favor.
Judge Sifton "stated that ALJ Nisnewitz had failed to conduct a hearing
over 'a number of days' and that he had not provided the reviewing
court with 'findings of fact and conclusions of law of some
complexity."' 19  Accordingly, Ms. Bush was awarded disability
insurance benefits retroactive to 1985 through December 31, 1989.
B. Pratts v. Chater
Pratts applied for disability benefits with the Social Security
Administration20 in November 1992. He claimed he was disabled due
to the manifestations of an HIV infection. Pratts, who was in his
no evidence of wheezing, rales or rhonchi. Dr. Weinstock, reports that the Ms. Bush's
symptoms had improved and that she experienced a marked response to bronchodilation
therapy.
"The claimant alleges that her daily activities are extremely constricted due to
persistent coughing spells.... However, the claimant noted that, between 1985 and 1989,
she was able to shop for clothing and shoes, wore perfume and lipstick and attended church
on a weekly basis. She further testified that she taught Sunday School. Her housekeeping
chores were limited to making beds, doing laundry, cleaning the bathroom and cooking.
Her husband reportedly performs chores such as vacuuming and grocery shopping. The
claimant also acknowledges that she has a driver's license and continued to drive through
1989."
"At hearing, the claimant testified that she traveled to the Middle East in 1989...
for a period of two weeks. The claimant also travels to South Carolina annually for a
two-week trip during the summer months. Presumably, if temperature extremes did, indeed,
exacerbate the claimant's symptoms, she would travel to South Carolina during a more
temperate time of the year. Despite the claimant's allegations that her coughing and
breathing difficulties are disabling, the Administrative Law Judge finds no diagnostic
studies of record which can reasonably suppvrt the claimant's allegations."
The claimant continued to attend church'., nerform limited housekeeping and
travels without limitation. Her activities, in conjunction with medical findings, lead the ALJ
to conclude that the claimant's symptoms were not as severe as "to render her incapable of
performing substantial gainful activity on a sustained basis."
11 He stated that "the Secretary has had more than enough time and opportunity to
pursue those inquiries and make those detailed findings of fact permitting me to review the
determination, so in these circumstances the remedy for the failure to explore these matters
in the past can only be reversal and a remand for an award."
20 Hereinafter, SSA.
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mid-forties at the time, alleged in his application that he had not been
able to work since April 1987 as a result of his impairments.2'
The SSA denied Pratts's November 1992 application for
benefits in March 1993, and also denied his request for reconsideration
in August 1993. An ALJ hearing was held in February 1994. Pratts
and Dr. Edgar Bonilla, a medical expert called by the SSA who based
his opinions on his review of Pratts's records from the VA, testified.
The hearing tape, however, was mistakenly turned off for a portion of
Dr. Bonilla's testimony, which left a significant gap in the
administrative record. The ALJ concluded that Pratts was not disabled
as defined in the Social Security Act on or before December 31, 1990.
The ALJ issued her decision in March 1994 and became the final
decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied review
on May 17, 1994. Pratts sought review of the Commissioner's decision
in district court. The district court granted the Commissioner's motion
with "substantial evidence" as the basis.
Il. Discussion and Analysis
The standard of review on appeal was well settled as the
substantial evidence test.22 "We therefore focus our attention on the
21 He had worked for roughly fifteen years as an industrial engineer and
mechanic, ajob requiring significant strength and exertion. Because of his employment
history, Pratts met the SSA's disability insured status requirements through December 31,
1990.
Pratts had been treated on an outpatient basis at the Veterans' Administration
Hospital (the "VA") in San Juan, Puerto Rico, starting in August 1987. Pratts did not have
one treating physician, but was seen primarily by doctors in the VA's Infectious DiseaseClinic. The inadequacies of his medical records are immediately evident: no record of his
second visit for gastroenteritis; no explanation provided for the diagnosis of AIDS made athis third visit; no blood test results appear in the records even though they were order; and
the physician's findings are almost completely illegible. "...Pratts continued to suffer from a
variety of maladies connected to his HIV infection and that his medical records continued
to display an unfortunate degree of inexactitude regarding test results, medications, weight
loss or gain, symptoms, and follow-up treatment.
22 Havas v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 783, 785 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Vargas v. Sullivan,898 F.2d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1990); Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231 (2d Cir. 1980).
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administrative ruling rather than on the decision of the district court."23
It was not the function of the appellate court to determine de novo
whether either Ms. Bush or Mr. Pratts was disabled.24 "We [appellate
court] may only set aside a determination which is... not supported by
substantial evidence."
25
In evaluating disability claims, the Secretary is required to use
a five-step sequence.26 In of Ms. Bush's, case the appellate court found
she did not have a "listed" impairment. The court concluded that "she
had the burden of proving that her impairment interfered with her
capacity to perform her relevant past work." The Secretary, AU
Nisnewitz, and the Second Circuit all concluded that Ms. Bush had not
shown that she was unable to perform her past relevant work. The ALJ
concluded that there was substantial evidence" to support the
Secretary's findings. The Second Circuit panel found such findings
"conclusive" and may not be questioned by the district court.
The court determined that Ms. Bush had repeated chances to
present such evidence. However, "she had never come close to meeting
23 Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991); Wagner v. Secretary of
HHS, 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990).
24 Mimms V. Heckler, 750 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1984).
25 Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
26 Promulgated in 20 C.F.R. @@ 404.1520, 416.920 (1981):
"First, the Secretary considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the Secretary next considers whether the claimant
has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do
basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed
in Appendix I of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the Secretary will
consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and
work experience; the Secretary presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a "listed"
impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does
not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe
impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the
claimant is unable to perform his past work, the Secretary then determines whether there is
other work which the claimant could perform." The burden of proving disability,
encompassing the first four of these steps, is on the claimant. The burden of proving the
fifth step is on the Secretary. Rivera v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 719, 722-23 (2d Cir. 1983)
(emphases added) (citations omitted).
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that burden."27 The district court failed to focus on her past relevant
work requirement, which remained critical in her case. The appellate
court concluded that there was no substantive evidence, and "absent a
finding that the claimant was actually disabled, delay alone is an
insufficient basis on which to remand for benefits." 2
"[T]he ALJ, unlike a judge in a trial, must herself affirmatively
develop the record in light of 'the essentially non-adversarial nature of
a benefits proceeding." 29 The duty to affirmatively develop arises from
"the Commissioner's regulatory obligations to develop a complete
medical record before making a disability determination"3 In Pratts,
the administrative record was inadequately developed by the ALI
Therefore, the decision to deny Pratts' benefits was unsupported by
substantial evidence as evidenced by the missing tape. However, in
Bush, the administrative record was adequately developed by the AL.
Therefore, the decision to deny Bush's benefits was supported by
substantial evidence as evidenced by the three government physicians
she saw.
In a cases such as these, where the assessment of disability
involves careful consideration of medical evidence, the testimony of
medical experts figures prominently in the AL's decision making.3
27 Not one doctor ever testified to this effect. The best she had done was to quote
(twice) her treating physician, that she continued to have relatively severe symptom
exacerbations with exposure to dust, damp weather, or flowers. She had developed food
allergies, which have also increased her allergic rhinitis symptoms. Another new problemhad been severe reflux esophagitis with episodes or aspiration of gastric secretions and dueto her allergic rhinitis and asthma, she should avoid work environments with cigarette
smoke, increased amounts of dust or molds spores or flowers.
2See Gilliland v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 1986) (a decision to reverse
and direct an award for benefits "should be made only when ... substantial evidence on the
record as a whole indicates that the Claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits").29Echevarria v. Secretary of HHS, 685 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 1982).
10 20 C.F.R. 404.1512(d)-(f) (1995). The duty exists even when, as here, the
claimant is represented by counsel. Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996).
31 The "hearing record upon which the ALJ relied was significantly
compromised by the failure to transcribe a portion of Dr. Bonilla's testimony."Williams
ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 261 (2d Cir. 1988) (findings of AU must be
consistent with medical evidence); Bell v. Secretary of HHS, 732 F.2d 308, 310-12 (2d Cir.
1984) (ALJ must carefully examine medical evidence, taking into account the entire
record).
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In Pratts, "[t]he sole evidence before the ALJ refuting Pratts's claims
of disabling pain and illness...was an incomplete medical history and an
expert opinion rendered from it."32  Finally in Pratts, "the ALJ made
several errors in assessing the evidence which may have influenced her
ultimate finding that Pratts was not disabled."33
The ALJ in Pratts "...committed several factual errors in
evaluating the medical evidence of Pratts's allegedly disabling
condition." For example, the ALJ stated there was no evidence of
marked weight loss or anemia, yet Pratts' medical records indicate an
almost twenty pound weight loss by December 1989, as well as anemia
in April and May 1990. The appellate court held her decision to deny
Pratts disability benefits as unsupported by substantial evidence. 34
32The appellate court concluded that much of Pratts' medical history is missing.
The only expert medical testimony was that of Dr. Bonilla, who relied exclusively on the
materials in this record to form his opinion that Pratts was capable of light work. Such a
record offers us no basis to find the substantial evidence necessary to uphold the ALJ's
decision. See Vargas, 898 F.2d at 295-96 (stating that a doctor's assessment of other
doctor's findings merits "little weight" in a disability determination); Hidalgo v. Bowen,
822 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1987) (testimony of physician who had never examined
claimant and relied on incomplete medical records did not constitute substantial evidence).
31. The ALJ also noted that Pratts' HIV infection was not corroborated by an
ELISA test despite a treatment note that Pratts was "ELISA positive since 4/24/88."
Additionally, the ALJ found no persistent sinusitis even though the medical records show
treatment for sinusitis in 1988, 1989, and 1990. The ALJ wrote that Pratts's "HIV positive
is controlled with vitamins and proteins," a statement that is directly contradicted by Pratts'
AZT prescription and perhaps indicates a failure to comprehend fully the nature of HIV and
AIDS. These errors further winnowed the amount of substantial evidence underlying the
AL's decision to deny Pratts disability benefits. See, e.g., Decker v. Harris, 647 F.2d 291,
295 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding ALJ's conclusion erroneous when contradicted by direct
evidence in the record).
11 The appellate court also found that the ALJ erred in her application of the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "grids"), 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 (1995), to
Pratts's case. Under the Social Security Act, the Commissioner bears the burden of proof for
the final determination of disability. Generally speaking, if a claimant suffers only from
exertional impairments, e.g., strength limitations, then the Commissioner may satisfy her
burden by resorting to the applicable grids. For a claimant whose characteristics match the
criteria of a particular grid rule, the rule directs a conclusion as to whether he is disabled. In
this case, if Pratts suffered only from exertional impairments, there is no dispute that the
grids would require a determination that he was not disabled based upon his age, education,
and prior work experience. If, however, Pratts "suffered from additional 'nonexertional'
impairments, the grid rules may not be controlling" and "the guidelines could not provide
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"When there are gaps in the administrative record or the AU
has applied an improper legal standard, we have, on numerous
occasions, remanded to the [Commissioner] for further development of
the evidence."35
IV. Conclusion
The reversal and remand, in the case of Mr. Pratts, was appropriate
because the appellate court was "'unable to fathom the ALJ's
rationale in relation to the evidence in the record' without 'further
findings or clearer explanation for the decision."' Mr. Pratts'
opportunity to have a ALJ's rationale be based on developed
substantive evidence in the record is an understandable outcome
because the Commisioner had not undertaken a diligent search. The
judgment to vaticate and remand in the case of Ms. Bush, was
appropriate because Ms. Bush had done nothing to satisfy her
burden, while the Secretary had gone to great lengths to satisfy its
burden. The two decisions while appearing on their face to be
contradictory, do infact satisfy one issue and that substaantial
evidence developed by any interested party is key to the finding of
disability.
the exclusive framework for making a disability determination." Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d
601, 604-05 (2d Cir. 1986).
3 Parker, 626 F,2d at 235; see also Hankerson v. Harris, 636 F.2d 893, 896 (2d
Cir. 1980).
